



NetKnowledge Webinar

Securing Your Voice Over IP Network



Presented by:

Jim Valentine, Senior Network Systems Consultant

Rick Blum, Senior Manager, Strategic Marketing

james.valentine@ins.com

rick.blum@ins.com

T h e k n o w l e d g e b e h i n d t h e n e t w o r k ®

International Network Services

- ◆ **Vendor-independent consulting services**
- ◆ **Build, secure and manage network infrastructure**
- ◆ **30+ offices in North America and Europe**
- ◆ **18,000+ engagements over 12 years**
- ◆ **Serve Fortune 1000 enterprises, service providers, and other network-centric organizations**



VoIP Security Buck Stops with Users

◆ **PBX vendors not responsible for switch security or toll fraud**

◆ **Courts place responsibility on user**


- *Management*
- *Telecommunications team*
- *IT team*
- *IT audit function*



◆ **U.S. legal mandates**

- *Jurisdiction – Dept of Treasury, Secret Service*
- *Title 18, Section 1029, US Code Credit and Debit Card Fraud Statute*
- *Title 18, Section 1030, US Code Computer Fraud and Abuse Act*
- *Title 18, Section 1343, US Code Wire Fraud Statute*

A Growing Problem



VoIP Security Vulnerabilities

◆ Voice transport protocols

- *RTP*
- *RTCP*
- *SCTP*

◆ Signaling protocols and architecture

- *SIP*
- *H.323*
- *MEGACO*
- *MGCP*

◆ Multivendor component environment

◆ Physical plant



What's at Risk?

- ◆ IP phones
- ◆ Core routers
- ◆ Media gateways
- ◆ SIP proxies
- ◆ Gatekeepers
- ◆ Location servers
- ◆ Switches
- ◆ VoIP-based firewalls
- ◆ Any equipment in VoIP infrastructure



Voice Data Convergence Multiplies Threats

- ◆ **VoIP inherits IP data network threat models**
 - *Reconnaissance, DoS, host vulnerability exploit, surveillance, hijacking, identity theft, misuse, etc.*
- ◆ **VoIP QoS requirements increase exposure to DoS attacks that affect:**
 - *Delay, jitter, packet loss, bandwidth*
- ◆ **PCs = authentication; phones = any user**
- ◆ **User identity theft**
 - *VoIP inherits PBX phone vulnerability*
 - *Unauthorized access and privileges, service theft*
- ◆ **Device identity theft**
 - *Malicious devices on IP network act like IP phones*
 - *Reduced service availability, eavesdropping*
 - *Inserting/Deleting/Modifying audio streams*

Risks if Attacked

◆ PBX, VM/ACD

- *Phone system downtime*
 - How long can you survive without your phone system?
- *Theft of services (long distance)*
 - Estimated at over \$13 billion annually

◆ Modems

- *Computer or network penetration*
- *Existing IP perimeter security may not detect*



Threats from Phreakers and Hackers

◆ Phreakers use phone system to:

- *Gain free calls*
- *Disrupt system*
- *Fun*

◆ Hackers use computer system to:

- *Gain free services/products*
- *Denial of Service (DoS)*
- *Business*
- *Fun*



**Merger of data and voice =
merger of threats**

Threats

- ◆ **Session hijacking**
- ◆ **Monitoring (eavesdropping)**
 - *Internal threat*
- ◆ **Service disruption**
 - Multilayer attacks
- ◆ **Toll fraud (theft of service)**
- ◆ **Service use and abuse**
 - *Internal threat*
- ◆ **Data security**




**Impact: Loss of essential
business resources**

Eavesdropping Threat


◆ Need access to wire

- Between IP phone (or customer premises gateway) and switch
- Between two switches

◆ Hub, knife, and clipper



Free Phone Call Threat



Denial of Service Threat

◆ DoS venues

- *Flood*
- *Abuse protocols*

◆ Target devices

- *IP phones (easy)*
- *Routers, switches (depends on equipment)*
- *Signaling gateways, media gateways, SIP proxies*
- *Any device in the path a call takes from a caller to a called party*

Media Transport: RTP Security Issues

◆ Denial of service

■ *Handling SSRC collisions*

- Sending command using SSRC of another participant
- Claiming SSRC of a user

■ *Packet injection*

- Same SSRC, higher sequence number, higher timestamp
- The fake content played before the real one

◆ Quality of service: bandwidth attack

■ *Changing audio encoding during session*

◆ Encryption fix

- *DES – breakable (like other technologies and products)*
- *If SIP used, DES key sent in clear with SDPs “k” parameter*
- *Actually introducing more delay and jitter*

No Holy Grail Security Infrastructure

- ◆ **Each company unique**
 - *What works for them may not work for you*
- ◆ **No vendor offers perfect solution**
 - *Prove it*
- ◆ **No solution is complete**
 - *Layered systems*
- ◆ **Layered defense starts with you**
 - *People are best defense*
 - *Policy and procedure critical*



Combating PBX & VM Vulnerabilities

- ◆ **First review available documentation**
 - *Voice systems manuals*
 - *NIST Special Publication 800-24 on PBX vulnerability*
- ◆ **Internal control and audit**
 - *Centralize telecom services requests*
 - *Develop policy and perform assessments*
 - *Recheck periodically*
- ◆ **PBX vendor or 3rd-party reporting**
 - *Look for unusual patterns*
 - *Consider log consolidation*
- ◆ **Toll fraud insurance**
 - *May be available from long-distance provider*
- ◆ **PBX disaster recovery and continuity plan**

Typical PBX Assessment

- ◆ Security policy
- ◆ Physical access
- ◆ System configuration
- ◆ Log
- ◆ Disaster recovery plan



PBX Best Practices

◆ Internal control and audit

- *Develop policy and perform assessments*
- *Eliminate unnecessary modems*
- *Centralize architecture*

◆ When vendors use modems for support

- *Turn off when not needed*
- *Use centralized remote access*
- *Audit usage*

◆ Authentication

- *Make passwords strong and unique*
- *Use two-factor authentication: tokens (SecurPBX Agent)*

◆ Filter traffic between PSTN/gateways and PBX/IP network

- *Telephony firewall*

VoIP Best Practices


- ◆ **Build separate DHCP servers**
 - *One for voice (IP phones)*
 - *One for data (PCs)*
- ◆ **Disable automated phone registration**
 - *Prevents rogue IP phones from grabbing a directory number from the IP PBX*
- ◆ **Monitor MAC addresses within voice segment**
- ◆ **Filtering in all segments should limit devices in unknown segments from connecting to IP PBX**

The Bottom Line

- ◆ *VoIP security is users' responsibility*
- ◆ *Vulnerabilities of voice and data systems carry over to VoIP*
- ◆ *Risks too big to ignore*
- ◆ *No turnkey solutions*
- ◆ *Implement security best practices with unique VoIP security measures*

INS Convergence Consulting Services

- ◆ Business strategy and network planning
- ◆ Network assessment
- ◆ VoIP architecture design
- ◆ VoIP implementation
- ◆ VoIP operations and optimization



Question and Answer

- ◆ Tell us what you think about this webinar

<http://www.ins.com/knowledge/surveys/feedback.asp>

- ◆ Upcoming webinar

- *Analyzing Business and Operations Processes for Improved Service Management, August 27th*

- ◆ For more information

- *Call 1-888-767-2988 in the U.S., 44 (0) 1628 503000 in Europe, or 1-408-330-2700 worldwide*



INS Resources

◆ White Paper

<http://www.ins.com/knowledge/whitepapers.asp>

- *Voice Over IP: An Overview for Enterprise Organizations and Carriers*

◆ NetKnowledge Webinars

http://www.ins.com/knowledge/webseminar_archives.asp

- *Getting Started on Voice Over IP*
- *VoIP Design Challenges and Solutions*

◆ Survey Reports

<http://www.ins.com/knowledge/surveys.asp>

- *Network Convergence*
- *Network Quality of Service*

Glossary

- ◆ **DES – Data Encryption Standard**
- ◆ **DoS – Denial of Service**
- ◆ **MEGACO – Media Gateway Controller**
- ◆ **MGCP – Media Gateway Control Protocol**
- ◆ **PBX – Private Branch Exchange**
- ◆ **RTCP – Realtime Control Protocol**
- ◆ **RTP – Realtime Transport Protocol**
- ◆ **SCTP – Stream Control Transmission Protocol**
- ◆ **SDP – Session Description Protocol**
- ◆ **SIP – Session Initiation Protocol**
- ◆ **SSRC – Synchronization source identifier (RTP header)**
- ◆ **TCP/IP – Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol**
- ◆ **VoIP – Voice over Internet Protocol**